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ABSTRACT
Security vulnerabilities in software pose an important threat to power grid security,
which can be exploited by attackers if not properly addressed. Every month, many vulner-
abilities are discovered and all the vulnerabilities must be remediated in a timely manner
to reduce the chance of being exploited by attackers. In current practice, security opera-
tors have to manually analyze each vulnerability present in their assets and determine the
remediation actions in a short time period, which involves a tremendous amount of human
resources for electric utilities. To solve this problem, we propose a machine learning-based
automation framework to automate vulnerability analysis and determine the remediation
actions for electric utilities. Then the determined remediation actions will be applied to
the system to remediate vulnerabilities. However, not all vulnerabilities can be remediated
quickly due to limited resources and the remediation action applying order will significantly
affect the system’s risk level. Thus it is important to schedule which vulnerabilities should
be remediated first. We will model this as a scheduling optimization problem to schedule
the remediation action applying order to minimize the total risk by utilizing vulnerabilities’
impact and their probabilities of being exploited.
Besides, an electric utility also needs to know whether vulnerabilities have already
been exploited specifically in their own power system. If a vulnerability is exploited, it has
to be addressed immediately. Thus, it is important to identify whether some vulnerabilities
have been taken advantage of by attackers to launch attacks. Different vulnerabilities may
require different identification methods. In this dissertation, we explore identifying exploited
vulnerabilities by detecting and localizing false data injection attacks and give a case study
in the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) system, which is a key control system to keep
the power system’s balance. However, malicious measurements can be injected to exploited
devices to mislead AGC to make false power generation adjustment which will harm power
system operations. We propose Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) Neural Network-based
methods and a Fourier Transform-based method to detect and localize such false data injec-
tion attacks. Detection and localization of such attacks could provide further information to
better prioritize vulnerability remediation actions.
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1 Introduction
Vulnerabilities in software pose an important threat to power grid security since
they could be exploited by adversaries to control power system computers and devices and
launch devastating attacks. Even with a flawless security architecture, vulnerabilities are
unavoidable and affect all installed software and hardware components. Moreover, electric
utilities are moving toward a more interconnected grid, which carries the potential for higher
risk exposure for those vulnerabilities. For those reasons, security vulnerability and patch
management (VPM) is an integral and currently one of the most important components of
power grid security [29].
Every month, many vulnerabilities are discovered [52]. In current VPM practice,
electric utilities need to quickly analyze vulnerabilities, decide how to remediate the vulner-
abilities and perform remediation actions to reduce security risks in the power systems. In
this dissertation, we will study how to help counter these vulnerabilities and automate the
VPM process. Specifically, we will automatically analyze the vulnerabilities and determine
remediation actions, optimize remediation action applying order to reduce the system’s se-
curity risk, and identify whether there is any vulnerability that has been exploited in this
system to help better prioritize the remediation actions.
1.1 Automating Vulnerability Remediation Analysis
When security vulnerabilities with their assets are discovered, security operators in
electric utilities need to decide how to remediate the vulnerabilities quickly to reduce se-
curity risks. However, making remediation decisions is not easy for electric utilities. First,
although patching can fix vulnerabilities, it is not always possible or preferable to patch
vulnerable assets since patching needs to reboot software and cause disruption of service.
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Thus, although urgent patches are installed quickly, electric utilities usually install other
patches to their assets under a certain maintenance schedule, e.g., quarterly. For some vul-
nerabilities that need timely attention but patching them might cause disruption of critical
service, they can be mitigated first before being patched later in the next maintenance cycle.
Second, vulnerabilities are far from equal in terms of security risk. As an example, the risk
of a Google Chrome vulnerability applying to a supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) operator workstation with constant user browser activity differs drastically to an
Internet browser vulnerability on an application server with no Internet access. An orga-
nization should immediately react to the former but can likely safely table the latter for a
while. Remediation decisions should reflect the priority of vulnerabilities based on their risks
to optimize the use of the limited security resources. Third, remediation decisions should
consider many factors about vulnerabilities and assets, such as whether a vulnerability has
exploit code available, whether the vulnerable asset is reachable from the Internet, the im-
pact of exploits, and whether patching disrupts power delivery service, making it a complex
reasoning process. Fourth, the volume of security vulnerabilities applicable to an electric
utility at any given time often exceeds the capacity of organizations to apply risk analysis.
Over the past few years, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Na-
tional Vulnerability Database (NVD) shows the number of software security vulnerabilities
found and publicly reported has more than doubled [55]. It is not uncommon for an electric
utility to have hundreds and even thousands of vulnerabilities each month for hundreds of
or more assets.
Unfortunately, currently remediation decisions are manually made in electric utilities
(at least in the U.S.). That induces long delays (typically in the order of weeks) in decid-
ing the remediation actions for vulnerabilities. Such long latency delays the application of
remediation actions and poses high security risks. The manual analysis also consumes a
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tremendous amount of human time, which increases the cost of VPM.
To address this problem, we propose a machine learning-based framework to automate
remediation decision analysis for electric utilities. The idea is to apply a predictive machine
learning model over vulnerability features and asset features to predict the remediation
decision for each vulnerability. The model can be built over historical, manual remediation
decision data to capture and mimic how human operators make decisions, but it can make
decisions much more quickly than manual analysis. Thus it has much shorter delays of
remediation decision making which can reduce security risks while reducing the cost of VPM
due to less manual efforts.
1.2 Remediation Action Scheduling Optimization
After we determine how to remediate the newly discovered vulnerabilities, the reme-
diation actions should be performed to address the vulnerabilities. Since there are hundreds
or even thousands of vulnerabilities to be remediated each month, not all vulnerabilities can
be patched quickly due to limited resources. The order to remediate the vulnerabilities will
heavily affect the security risk that the system is facing.
In practice, some organizations are based on operators’ manual assessment or even
their preference to apply remediation actions. Some organizations apply patches based on
the prioritization order provided by the patch management software, where the patches are
prioritized by vulnerabilities’ impact such as Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
score [28]. These methods do not consider vulnerability exploitabilty dynamic attribute.
They prioritize the order based on the vulnerability’s attribute at the time point when the
vulnerability is published. However, the exploitability of a vulnerability is changing over
time and so is the risk that a vulnerability poses to a power system. As an example, if
two vulnerabilities Va and Vb are published at the same day. Va with a lower CVSS score
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could be explored in 2 days after being published, and Vb with higher CVSS score might
not be exploited even in 30 days after being published. If vulnerabilities are prioritized only
based on CVSS score, Vb should be patched first. However, in this case, patching Va first
will be a better way to reduce the risk of being exploited. Thus it is important to schedule
the remediation action applying order by considering the probabilities of being exploited to
reduce the security risk.
We will schedule the remediation actions orders based on vulnerabilities’ impact on
the system and their probabilities of being exploited over time. One vulnerability’s risk can
be calculated with its impact on the system and its probability of being exploited. For many
newly discovered vulnerabilities, since the probability of being exploited is unknown, we will
first predict the probabilities of being exploited over time for these vulnerabilities. With the
predicted probabilities, the vulnerabilities’ security risk over time can be calculated. Then
we can model this problem as an Mixed Integer Programming problem and schedule the
remediation action order so that the total risk is as low as possible.
1.3 Identifying Exploited Vulnerabilities
Even though vulnerabilities’ exploitability can be estimated, the electric utility still
needs to know whether some vulnerabilities have already been exploited specifically for their
power system. If a vulnerability is exploited, it has to be remediated immediately. Thus
it is important to identify whether some vulnerabilities have been taken advantage of by
attackers to launch attacks. Different vulnerabilities may require different identification
methods. Here, we explore identifying exploited vulnerabilities by detecting and localizing
false data injection attacks and give a case study in the Automatic Generation Control
(AGC) system.
AGC is a key control system in the power grid which aims to keep balance between
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power generation and load and maintain a stable power system frequency. It automatically
adjusts power generation in response to area control imbalance. A power system usually
consists of a number of interconnected control areas. A control area is connected to its
neighboring areas through tie-lines, and power sharing between two neighboring areas occurs
on these tie-lines. Each control area has its own AGC with the function to adjust the
amount of power generation to keep its frequency in the scheduled range and keep the power
exchanges with other areas to the values agreed upon in economic dispatch. The required
adjustment in power generation in each control area is called Area Control Error (ACE),
which is calculated based on the frequency deviation and power exchange deviation. It is
calculated every 2-4 seconds and then the set-point of the generator governors participating
in AGC is changed based on the calculated ACE.
In AGC, a control center periodically collects the power system’s frequency and tie-
line power flow measurements from meters to calculate ACE. If malicious tie-line power flow
or frequency data is injected to normal measurement to mislead AGC to do miscalculations,
AGC may issue wrong commands based on the miscalculated ACEs. As an example, when
ACE is positive which implies the power is over generating, AGC should decrease the power
generation. However, if the false tie-line power flow or frequency data injected results in
a negative ACE value, AGC believes that the area is under generation and will issue a
command to increase the power generation, which exaggerates the over generating situation.
False data can be injected to the system in two ways. One way is to directly inject
the false data packets to the communication network channel. However, such attacks can be
easily detected by authentication techniques. The other way is to compromise and control the
devices such as meters to launch such attacks. If there are some unaddressed vulnerabilities
existing in a device, attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities to compromise the device.
The increasing number of smart devices in the power grid and the connection to external
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networks make this way more feasible. If the false injected data are carefully designed,
existing methods implemented in control centers such as State Estimation (SE) and Bad
Data Detection (BDD) [18] are unable to detect intelligent cyber attacks. The work in [63]
has shown that the existing schemes can be bypassed by carefully designed false data injection
attacks.
If the attacks can be detected and localized, we will know which devices and vul-
nerabilities are exploited, and thus can better prioritize the vulnerability remediation. We
propose Neural Network-based and Fourier Transform-based approaches to detect and local-
ize false data injection attacks in AGC. In the first approach, we adopt Long Short Term
Memory (LSTM) neural network to learn ACE patterns from historical data, predict ACE
sequence pattern for next detection window based on the learned patterns, compare the
predictions with the corresponding ACE sequence pattern calculated from measurements to
determine whether there is forged data in the sequence. The LSTM model can be built with
a single feature: the historical ACE data (single-feature LSTM) [65] [31]. It can also in-
clude more related features (i.e. multi-feature LSTM), such as frequency and tie-line power
flow, to achieve better performance. The LSTM-based approach is also developed to localize
attacks by checking which measurement is abnormal so that we can know which meter is
compromised. In the second approach, we convert ACE and measurement data from the
time domain to the frequency domain by using Fourier Transform and then check if ACE
data is normal in the frequency domain [65]. We test these approaches on both simulated
and real datasets. Since we only use historical data that are already available in current




Chapter 2 discusses the work of vulnerability remediation analysis automation. Then
we describe how to optimize the remediation action applying order in Chapter 3. In Chapter
4, we discuss a case study of AGC about exploited vulnerabilities identification. We conclude
the dissertation work in the last chapter.
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2 Automating Vulnerability Remediation Analysis
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a machine learning-based framework to automate remedi-
ation decision analysis for electric utilities. The idea is to apply a predictive machine learning
model over vulnerability features and asset features to predict the remediation decision for
each vulnerability. The model can be built over historical, manual remediation decision data
to capture and mimic how human operators make decisions. The machine learning model is
also able to provide reasons why the predicted decisions are made.
The machine learning-based automation framework leverages two recent develop-
ments related to the electric sector. First, the North American Electric Reliability Cor-
poration (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) version 5 [8] regulatory require-
ments to maintain baseline configurations ensure the availability of well-formed software
asset information in electric utilities. Second, the availability of well-formed and machine
readable vulnerability information through the NIST NVD and third party service providers
has significantly improved over the past few years [55].
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces current practices of VPM
in electric utilities and presents results of a survey. Section 2.3 presents the machine learning-
based automation framework. Section 2.4 introduces the instantiation of the framework in
one electric utility. Section 2.5 presents evaluation results.Section 2.6 reviews related work.
The last two sections present discussions and conclude the chapter.
2.2 Current Practice of VPM in Electric Utilities
As recommended practice for VPM by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) [22], which is shown in Fig. 2.1, when vulnerabilities are discovered, organizations
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first need to analyze whether a vulnerability will affect their systems by taking into consid-
eration both vulnerability and asset information, and determine a remediation action for the
vulnerability such as patching and mitigation.
It is not easy for utilities to perform VPM in practice. New vulnerabilities are discov-
ered and new patches are released almost every day. Utilities have to spend a lot of time and
human resources analyzing vulnerabilities and deciding on remediation actions. The NERC
CIP standards [8] require strict monthly obligations for identifying and assessing security
vulnerability and patches. Compliance to the standards is monitored closely through NERC
and monetary penalties are regularly enforced. Likewise, the electric industry has a punitive





















Figure 2.1: Vulnerability and patch management process
To gain more insights into the current practice, we also conducted a survey in the elec-
tric sector. The survey was distributed broadly to U.S. electric companies through national
critical infrastructure protection groups and conducted anonymously due to constraints in
sharing information so closely related to compliance with regulation. We received responses
from 16 electric companies. 100% of the responded organizations perform manual analysis
of vulnerabilities and patches. Around 60% of them need process more than 3000 security
vulnerabilities each year and half of respondents spend more than 400 person hours monthly
on VPM. All of them keep historical records of vulnerabilities and patches. The survey shows
that VPM is indeed time-consuming and intensive work for utilities in practice.
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2.3 Machine Learning-based Framework for Remediation Action Analysis
Security operators consider many factors to decide remediation actions for vulner-
abilities. The factors include vulnerability information such as whether the vulnerability
affects integrity, availability, or confidentiality, whether an exploit of the vulnerability is al-
ready available, what Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) score [28] is, and so
on. The factors also include asset information such as whether the vulnerable device is a
critical field device for power grid operations, whether the vulnerable device is sensitive to
confidentiality/integrity/availability attacks, what the software is, and so on. Decisions are
made considering the values of these factors. For example, if a vulnerability is at a non-
critical device, only has little impact and there is no exploit available yet, it does not need
to be addressed now and can be patched in the next scheduled cycle. If a vulnerability can
be exploited, and it is at a user workstation, the decision is to patch immediately; if it is at
a critical server, because patching a server may influence the power grid service, the decision
is to mitigate it first and patch it later in the next scheduled cycle.
This process is tedious and repetitive, and we propose to automate remediation action
analysis. Intuitively, one might consider manually making a set of rules (where each rule
consists a combination of factor values for all factors and a decision for this combination) and
use them to automate remediation action analysis similar to expert systems [37]. However,
there are practical challenges with rule-based analysis: to cover all possible cases, the number
of rules will grow exponentially. For example, at one of our utility partners, around 16
factors are considered and each factor has a number of values. The total number of possible
combinations of factor values is about 240 billion. It is infeasible to manually generate so
many rules in the first place, not to mention maintaining and updating them dynamically.

















Figure 2.2: Machine learning-based framework
propose a machine learning-based framework (see Fig. 2.2) for remediation decision analysis
which, based on vulnerability and asset features, automatically analyzes vulnerabilities and
predicts remediation decisions, e.g., whether to patch them now or defer the patching to next
regularly scheduled maintenance cycle. Central to the framework is the machine learning
model, which not only outputs an remediation action but also an easy-to-verify reason code
in case operators want to verify some predictions. The model can be trained from histor-
ical operation data that contains vulnerability information, asset information, and manual
remediation decisions for a set of vulnerabilities. Our industry survey mentioned in Section
2.2 indicates that all the electric utilities surveyed maintain their historical operation data.
This is expected specially in electric sectors because of the regulatory requirements for VPM.
Our framework is consistent with the DHS guideline described in Section 2.2, but introduces
machine learning-based automation to it and provides more details.
The goal of this work is to make machine learning predictions as accurate as manual
decisions. That can help reduce security risks through making remediation decisions for
vulnerabilities much more quickly and taking actions more quickly (see Section 2.5.9 for
analysis).
11






















2.3.1 Vulnerability Features and Management
Vulnerability features are already well established by the NVD. In the NVD, each
vulnerability comes with a set of CVSS metrics that characterizes the vulnerability in dif-
ferent aspects. In our framework, we use CVSS metrics as vulnerability features since they
are relevant to risk assessment and remediation decision analysis. The features and their
possible values are shown in Table 2.1. The CVSS score is a number between 0 and 10
determined by the metrics to describe, in general, a vulnerability’s overall severity. Attack
Vector shows how a vulnerability can be exploited, e.g., through the network or local access.
Exploitability indicates the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited. High as the highest
level means exploit code has been widely available, and Unproven as the lowest level means
no exploit code is available, with two other levels in between. User Interaction (Privilege,
resp.) indicates the amount of user interaction (the level of privilege, resp.) needed by an at-
tacker to exploit the vulnerability. The other four metrics describe the complexity of attack
and the impact of attack in confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Detailed explanations
of the metrics can be found in [28]. Each characteristic’s effect on the remediation decision
making is also studied in the paper [66].
The NVD publishes vulnerabilities for a variety of software products daily. Each
vulnerability is identified by a unique Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID, such
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as CVE-2016-8882. An organization can retrieve the vulnerabilities (including CVEs and
vulnerability features) of their assets through identifying the Common Platform Enumeration
(CPE) names [54] of their assets and then querying the NVD (NVD provides API for such
queries) using the CPEs. CPE is a naming standard to represent software and structured
in a manner making it possible to search applicable vulnerabilities [53] automatically. An
organization can manually identify CPEs of their assets once and use them for years without
needing to update them, and thus the maintenance cost is low.
It is worthy to note that the learning framework is general and can support other
vulnerability features that a company might use (e.g., other features provided by third-party
services). Also, if a company only uses part of the CVSS metrics in remediation decision
analysis, then the learning model can be built upon those metrics.
2.3.2 Asset Features and Management
Although vulnerability features have a well established CVE standard for maintain-
ing publicly disclosed vulnerability information, vulnerability features alone do not provide
sufficient information for meaningful remediation analysis on individual cyber assets. One
treats very differently a vulnerable system providing direct services on the Internet (e.g. a
web server) from the same vulnerability applying to an isolated system in a highly controlled
local network. Likewise, browser vulnerabilities apply very differently to different cyber as-
sets. Clearly an office computer primarily used for email and web browsing is significantly
more vulnerable than a server with almost no user interaction which happens to have the
same browser installed. The NVD CVSS system recommends to use three asset features,
confidentiality requirement, integrity requirement, and availability requirement, to calculate
environment scores. However, only the three asset features are insufficient and security oper-
ators not only consider these features when deciding vulnerability remediation. For example,
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whether the asset can be accessed externally is a critical factor when a vulnerability can be
launched through network. Thus we identify two more asset features to complement those
three. Another difference from the environmental CVSS system is that our approach uses
machine learning to integrate these features into one decision making model rather than cal-
culating environmental scores using simple formulas. All the five asset features are described
below.
• Workstation User Login: (Yes or No) - Associates with the vulnerability user interac-
tion feature. Whether the cyber asset provides an interactive workstation for a human
operator. If the cyber asset does not have interactive use, then vulnerabilities affecting
applications such as web browsers would have significantly less impact.
• External Accessibility: (High, Authenticated-Only or Limited) - Associates with the
vulnerability attack vector feature. The degree to which cyber assets are externally
accessible outside of the cyber system. For example, High may mean a web server
providing public content, and Authenticated-Only may be a group of remotely acces-
sible application servers which require login before use. Limit means there is no direct
connectivity to the external network (but it could be connected to a device that is
externally accessible).
• Confidentiality Requirement: (High, Medium or Low) - Associated with the vulnera-
bility confidentiality impact feature. If the confidentiality requirement of the asset is
set as “High”, loss of confidentiality will have severe impact on the asset.
• Integrity Requirement: (High, Medium or Low) - Similar to Confidentiality Require-
ment but focused on integrity.
• Availability Requirement: (High, Medium or Low) - Similar to Confidentiality Re-
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quirement but focused on integrity.
Again, an organization can always customize for their needs by adding and/or removing
some asset features based on their operation practice.
Group-based asset feature management Whereas the software vulnerability fea-
ture set has a worldwide community to maintain consistent machine-readable features (i.e.
through the NVD), the cyber asset features must be maintained by the organization. Ac-
cording to our survey, one organization can have thousands of assets and assets may change
frequently (i.e. one asset may be removed or another new asset might be added). Due to
the large amount of assets and their instability, it is cumbersome to analyze and maintain
the characteristic values for each asset. In order to reduce the cost of maintenance, we
divide assets into asset groups based on their roles or functions. For example, all Remote
Terminal Units (RTUs) of a specific vendor and function can be categorized into one group
since they have similar features. Similarly, all firewalls can be in one group. The assets
in the same group share the same set of values for asset features. Then human operators
can determine and maintain the feature values for each group. In our experiments with the
electric utilities, categorization groups remained mostly consistent through large increases
in asset population. For example, an operator workstation in a control center has the same
features whether there are five or 100. Although assets may come and go, we find it is much
less common for an entirely new asset group to appear. Since the number of groups is much
smaller than the number of assets, grouping will greatly reduce the amount of efforts needed
in maintaining feature values.
2.3.3 Machine Learning Algorithm Selection
Many machine learning algorithms are available today and we need to identify the best
one to solve our problem. In this framework, we adopt the decision tree model to automate
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remediation action analysis for the following reasons: (1) Decision tree-based decision making
resembles human reasoning. On each level of the tree, the model chooses the most important
factor and splits the problem space into multiple branches based on the factor’s value. Unlike
many other machine learning models such as neural networks and logistic regression that are
not very transparent, the decision tree model allows us to see what the model does in every
step and know how the model makes decisions. Thus the predictions from decision tree can
be interpreted, and a reason code can be derived to explain predictions. Human operators
can verify the predictions based on reason code. (2) For this VPM automation problem,
decision tree is proven to have very good performance in our experiments compared with



























































Figure 2.3: An example of trained decision tree model
For illustration purposes, Fig. 2.3 shows a sample trained decision tree model in the
remediation action analysis context. The prediction process for a vulnerability based on this
tree is as follows. When a new vulnerability data record is fed into the model for prediction,
the model will first look at the exploitability feature at the root node. If the exploitability
is not Unproven, it will go to check the asset feature ”workstation login”. If the workstation
allows user login, it means it faces more risks and must be patched immediately. Other tree
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branches can be traversed by other records similarly.
2.3.4 Reason Code Generation
It is very difficult for a predictive machine learning tool to be 100% accurate. To
increase transparency in the predictive decision, our approach provides human operators
with both prediction confidence and a readable description (called reason code) of why the
model selected the decision. The use of decision tree makes reason code generation feasible.
A trained decision tree model is a collection of connected nodes and splitting rules organized
in a tree structure. Then the reason code for each leaf node (decision node) can be derived by
traversing the tree path and combining the splitting rules of the nodes in the path. However,
for some long paths (e.g., one tree we built over a utility’s data has an 18-node path), the
reason code could become very long, redundant, and hard to read if simply combining the
splitting rules. To address this issue, we use two rules to simplify and shorten the raw reason
codes derived from the decision path.
• Intersection: we can reduce redundancy by finding range intersection. For example,
for continuous data such as CVSS scores, if one condition in the reason code is “CVSS
Score is larger than 5.0” and the other condition is “CVSS Score is larger than 7.0”,
then we can find the intersection and the reason code can be reduced to “CVSS Score
is larger than 7.0”.
• Complement: for some features that appear in several conditions of a path, we can
replace these conditions by using its complementary condition. For example, for in-
tegrity impact, the set of possible values is Complete, Partial, None. If the reason
code is “Integrity impact is not None, and Integrity impact is not Partial”, since the
complement of Partial, None is Complete, the reason code can be reduced to “Integrity
is Complete”.
17
2.3.5 Model Dynamic Training
The decision rationales of an electric utility are usually quite stable, but there are still
changes in a longer time scale. Thus, the decision tree model should be dynamically updated
and trained with the most recent historical data to capture the changes. For example, in each
month (which is the typical working cycle of VPM in electric utilities), the machine learning
model is retrained with the previous n (n can be customized for each organization) months’
data. Note that the predicted decisions output by the model cannot be used as training
data since the predictions are not always accurate. To address this issue, for each month’s
predicted decisions, human operators can verify a small portion of the predictions (e.g., 10%)
to check the framework’s performance, and these manually verified/checked vulnerabilities
and predictions can be used as training data for retraining the model. Our experiments will
show that a small portion of manual verification each month will achieve high prediction
accuracy for the retrained model (see Section 2.5).
2.4 Instantiation of the Framework: A Case Study for an Electric Utility
To study how the machine learning-based framework works in the real world, we apply
and instantiate the framework for one electric utility based on its VPM operation practices
and data. Due to the high sensitivity of the VPM operation information, the company
required us to anonymize its name, and thus we refer to it as OrgA in this paper.
In this instance of the framework, the vulnerability features used are the nine at-
tributes in CVSS metrics, i.e., CVSS Score, Exploitability, Attack Vector, Attack Complex-
ity, User Interaction, Privilege, Confidentiality Impact, Integrity Impact, and Availability
Impact. The asset features used are Workstation User Login, External Accessibility, Con-
fidentiality Requirement, Integrity Requirement, and Availability Requirement. These fea-
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tures are used by human operators when they make remediation decisions. The possible
remediation actions are Patch-Now, Mitigate-Now-Patch-Later, and Patch-Later, which are
also used by the operators.
To get asset features, an asset list is first obtained from the company’s baseline
configuration management tool. Then the assets are grouped into 43 groups based on their
functions. For each asset group, the value for each asset feature is identified. For the
company, these asset features and feature values are quite stable, with no need to change
in years. To get vulnerabilities and vulnerability features, a CPE is generated for each
software/firmware based on software/firmware name and version which are also available in
the baseline configuration management tool. Then we use a Python program developed by
us to automatically query the NVD through its API using the CPE as a parameter and
retrieve applicable vulnerabilities including their CVEs and CVSS vectors from the NVD.
Vulnerability retrieval needs to be done pretty frequently, and the Python program makes it
automatic and easy. Note that third party services that aggregate vulnerabilities for utilities
also provide the same CVE and CVSS information usable in our framework.
The decision tree is implemented in Python based on the library Scikit-learn. The
utility maintains VPM operation data including historical vulnerabilities, their associated
assets, and the manual remediation decisions for them made by operators. That allows a
decision tree model to be trained using the utility’s historical data. It is worthy to note
that some decision tree parameters should be tuned based on the dataset to achieve best
performance (see Section 2.5.2 for details). After the model is trained, when a new vulner-
ability is obtained, its vulnerability features together with its asset features will be fed into
the decision tree model for analysis.
The model outputs three pieces of information: predicted decision, confidence, and
reason code. The confidence valued between 0 and 1 shows how confident the model is
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Table 2.2: Sample prediction results for three vulnerabilities




1 High  1 1 0 0 0 
2 Functional  2 0 1 0 0 
3 Proof-of-Concept  3 0 0 1 0 































































































Predicted action Confidence Reason code 
Patch-Later 1 
Unproven Exploitability, CVSS Score is less 




Proof-of-Concept Exploitability, Network 
Attack, High External Accessibility 
and High Confidentiality Impact 
Patch-Now 1 
not Unproven Exploitability and this 
Workstation allows users’ login 
 
with the prediction. It can guide operators to select predictions for manual verification,
e.g., verifying those predictions with low confidence. Reason code helps human operators to
understand and verify the prediction. Table 2.2 shows examples of the predictions for three
different vulnerabilities. The first one shows that the predicted action is ‘Patch Later’ with
100% confidence. The reasoning for that choice is that the vulnerability is not exploitable,
the CVSS score is less than 4.2, which suggests a low asset impact, and it has a medium
confidentiality impact. The other two predictions can be interpreted in a similar way. We
will present detailed experiment results in the next section.
2.5 Evaluations
This section presents experimental results for the instance of the framework described
in Section 2.4.
2.5.1 Dataset
We collected two datasets from OrgA, each containing one year of data. One dataset
was collected from June 2016 to May 2017, with 3,476 vulnerability data records. The other
dataset was collected from January 2018 to December 2018, with 3,660 records. For conve-
nience, we refer to the two datasets as 2017A and 2018A respectively. Each vulnerability
data record includes the following information: its associated software, vulnerability fea-
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tures, its associated asset, and asset features. Additionally, each record also includes the
remediation decision for the vulnerability made by human operators.
2.5.2 Parameter Tuning for Decision Tree
min_samples_leaf






















Figure 2.4: Prediction over
min leaf samples
Max Depth of Tree






















Figure 2.5: Prediction over tree depth
To prevent the tree from going too deep and avoid overfitting, the minimum number
of samples at a leaf node (if the number of samples in a node is no more than the minimum
number, the node will stop splitting) and the maximum depth of the tree should be properly
set. These two parameters can be tuned based on the deployment environment. In our
implementation, the 2017A dataset from the utility is used to tune these two parameters. In
particular, a random 70% of the dataset was used as training data and the other 30% was
used as testing data, and the two parameters were tuned based on the testing performance.
We experimented on different minimum numbers of samples in leaf nodes and the
results are shown in Fig. 2.4. “min samples leaf” is the minimum number of samples required
for a leaf node. The smaller “min samples leaf” is, the more the tree splits and the deeper
and larger the tree is. As shown in Fig. 2.4, when “min samples leaf” is 8, it has highest
prediction accuracy 97.22%. Here, Prediction accuracy is defined as the fraction of predicted
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decisions that are the same as human operator’s manual decisions. When “min samples leaf”
decreases, the prediction accuracy decreases since the tree is too specific to generalize to new
samples. If “min samples leaf” is too large where the tree is short and small, the prediction
accuracy also decreases because the trained tree does not capture sufficiently fine-grained
information of the training data. Thus we set the minimum number of samples in leaf nodes
as 8 for the remaining experiments.
The prediction accuracy under different tree max depth is shown in Fig. 2.5. When
the tree depth goes over 25, the prediction accuracy does not change any more. Usually,
when the max depth is larger, the tree is allowed to go deeper and there will be an overfitting
issue. However, in this situation, since the the minimum number of leaf is set as 8, the tree
will stop splitting when the leaf samples is equal to or less than 8 and thus it cannot go too
deep. We set the tree max depth as 50 for the remaining experiments.
2.5.3 Prediction Accuracy
In this experiment, we test the model over the two datasets from organization OrgA
separately. Each dataset is randomly split into two parts, 70% for training and 30% for
testing. We use prediction accuracy and false negative rate to describe the performance.
The false negative rate is defined as the fraction of predictions where the manual decision is
Patch-Now or Mitigate-Now-Patch-Later but the prediction is Patch Later. False negative
rate should be minimized since it delays the remediation of vulnerabilities while they should
be addressed more timely. The results are shown in Fig. 2.6. For the 2017A dataset, the
prediction accuracy is 97.02%, and false negative is 1.24%. For the 2018A dataset, the
prediction accuracy is 98.82% and the false negative is 1.09%. The accuracy is quite high,
which means using machine learning to predict remediation actions is feasible.
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Figure 2.6: Prediction accuracy on 2017A and 2018A dataset
diction is already high, we still want to figure out what caused false predictions. For the
2017A dataset, after exploring the 2.98% of falsely predictions, we found that they were
mainly caused by inconsistent manual remediation decisions in the historical dataset where
some vulnerabilities with identical features were given different manual decisions, which can
confuse the decision tree (and actually any other learning algorithm). The same problem
caused the prediction error over the 2018A dataset as well.
This situation happens for several reasons. In a company, there are usually a group
of security operators analyzing vulnerabilities and making remediation decisions. Different
operators may have different decisions for vulnerabilities with identical features and even
for the same vulnerabilities. Even if there is only one operator, for two vulnerabilities with
identical features, s/he might make different decisions when processing them at different
times (e.g., last week and this week). This is especially possible for vulnerabilities whose
risk level is not at the clearly high risk end (which typically goes to Patch-Now and Mitigate-
Now-Patch-Later) or the clearly low risk end (which typically goes to Patch Later) but goes
in the middle. This is a kind of human mistake that operators cannot totally avoid.
For each set of vulnerability records that have identical features but different manual
decisions, if we assume the majority decision of this set is the correct decision and the
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records with minority decisions are deemed errors and removed from the dataset (about 3%
records are removed for the 2017A dataset), then the prediction accuracy achieves 99.8%
and the false negative rate achieves 0.20% for the 2017A dataset, with similar improvement
for the 2018A dataset. This result shows that the prediction performance can be improved
significantly if there are less inconsistent manual decisions in the training dataset. We plan
to further explore this problem in collaboration with the utility company and improve our
design in future work.
We also found that, for records with same features but different manual decisions,
their prediction confidence will be relatively low. For example, suppose one leaf node of the
decision tree contains four records with exactly the same features, and three of them were
remediated by Patch-Now and one by Mitigate-Now-Patch-Later. Then the decision tree
will output Patch-Now as the predicted decision with confidence 0.75. If operators are able
to verify/correct the predictions with relatively low confidence (i.e. under 0.9), that can
improve the performance to 99.42% accuracy and 0.38% false negative for the 2017A dataset
and 99.45% accuracy and 0.09% false negative. Since there are only about 10% of predictions
with confidence under 0.9, the manual verification time will be much shorter than manually
making all the remediation decisions.
2.5.4 Reason Code Verification
Each prediction comes with one reason code so that users can verify the prediction
when needed. Here, we first look into the length of reason code. For reason codes, we use
the number of conditions that a reason code has to denote its length. For example, the
length of reason code “Unproven Exploitability, CVSS Score is less than 4.2, and Medium
Confidentiality Impact” is 3 because it includes 3 conditions. For predictions described
in Section 2.5.3, the average length of reason code is 6.9 conditions. After applying the
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length reduction rules proposed in Section 2.3.4, the average length is reduced to 3.6 con-
ditions. For example, the reason code “Unproven Exploitability, CVSS Score is less than
9.15, External Accessibility is not High, CVSS Score is less than 6.30, External Accessibility
is not Authenticated-Only, and Medium Availability Impact” can be reduced to “Unproven
Exploitability, CVSS Score is less than 6.3, Limited External Accessibility, and Medium
Availability Impact”. The length reduction rules can significantly reduce the length of the
reason codes so that it can be easier to understand and verify.
We then test whether the reason codes generated by the tool are sufficient to verify
predicted decisions, check the time needed to verify the reason codes, and compare it with the
time needed to verify predictions based on the corresponding vulnerabilities’ raw features.
To do this, we randomly selected 100 predictions from the testing data, and asked a security
operator from the organization OrgA to verify these predictions based on reason codes and
based on the raw features.
Results show that 98 out of the 100 reason codes are sufficient to verify the predicted
decisions. One prediction is found to be wrong through the reason code verification. The
other one reason code is insufficient to verify the prediction.
The time spent on reason code verification and raw feature based verification is shown
in Fig. 2.7. Most of the reason codes can be verified in a very short time. 35% of reason
codes can be verified in 5 seconds, and 90% in 45 seconds. The average verification time is
28.8 seconds. From the figure, it can be seen that verification based on raw features requires
much more time than verification based on reason code. Only 35% of predictions can be
verified in 60 seconds and about 40% takes over 4 minutes to verify. The average time of raw
feature based verification is 7 minutes. The results show that the efficiency of reason codes.
It is reasonable, because reason codes are derived (and optimized) from the decision tree and
the decision tree to some extent prioritizes the judging conditions in the decision making
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process based on their importance and hides unimportant factors from being considered.
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Figure 2.7: Time of reason code-based
verification and feature-based verification





































Figure 2.8: Monthly prediction accuracy
2.5.5 Prediction with Dynamic Training
In the above experiments, the twelve months’ data are randomly split into training
data and testing data. In practice, the decision tree model should be dynamically updated
and trained with recent historical data as discussed in Section 2.3.5. In this experiment,
we test the model’s prediction accuracy with dynamic training. In particular, we assume
the operator randomly selects 10% of each month’s predictions to check and verify. At each
month, we use the recent six months’ vulnerabilities and decisions that have been manually
checked by operators as training data to train a new decision tree model, and use it to
predict for next month. The prediction results over the 2018A dataset are shown in Fig. 2.8.
The x-axis means which month it is predicted for and y-axis is the prediction accuracy. For
example, when the x-axis is 7, it uses 10% of the first six months’ data to train the model
and predicts decisions for month 7. Then it uses 10% of the data from the second month to
the seventh month to train the model and predict for the eighth month’s vulnerabilities. It
can be seen that the prediction accuracy is not the same for different months, but overall
26
it is high. The prediction performance for the 2017A dataset under dynamic training has
similar trends. Thus, dynamic training is feasible.
2.5.6 Prediction with Different Feature Sets
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Figure 2.9: Prediction on Different Feature Sets
In general, the more useful features are used, the better the machine learning per-
forms. In the above testing experiments, we use 16 features consisting of software name,
vulnerability characteristics, asset name, and asset features. In these features, vulnerability
characteristics and asset characteristics are stable since their set of possible feature values
(e.g., 0-10 for CVSS score) does not change. However, the software name and asset name
have infinite possible values and are very easy to change. For example, there might be a
totally new software name that the decision tree model has never seen before. Such change-
able features might induce more effort to maintain the machine learning model. Thus, we
test how the machine learning model performs software name or asset name. We also ex-
plore how the model performs only with the vulnerability characteristics, and only with asset
characteristics.
The prediction performances on different feature sets over the 2017A dataset are
shown in Fig. 2.9. The figure shows the prediction performance when using the features
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without software name, features without asset name, features without software name and
asset name, only vulnerability features, and only asset features respectively. We can see that
without software name or asset name as features, the prediction accuracy decreases about
0.3%, which is still good performance. However, with only vulnerability characteristics as
features, the prediction accuracy is about 83.78%, and with only asset characteristics as
features the prediction accuracy is only 68.33%. The results indicate that both vulnerability
and asset characteristics should be considered as features in the machine learning model.
2.5.7 Prediction with Different Amounts of Training Samples
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Figure 2.10: Predictions over Different Training Sample Numbers
Training data is required to enable the machine learning model to work. Some orga-
nizations may not have their historical vulnerability and remediation decision data. One way
to generate training data is to let security operators manually make remediation decisions
for some vulnerabilities. Here we explore how many training data samples are needed so that
the model has good prediction performance. The prediction accuracy over different training
sample numbers of 2018A dataset is shown in Fig. 2.10. Generally, the larger the training
dataset is, the higher the prediction accuracy is. When there are 100 training samples, the
28
prediction accuracy is over 95%, which means the learning model is easy to build up for a
reasonable performance.
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Figure 2.11: Comparison with other machine learning models
In this section, we experiment on how the decision tree model performs compared
with other popular machine learning models: logistic regression, support vector machine
(SVM), Naive Bayes, k-nearest neighbors (KNN) and neural network. The 2017A dataset
was used, with a random 70% of it as training data and the remaining 30% as testing data.
The results are shown in Fig. 2.11. It can be seen that the decision tree model performs
better than other models. The decision tree has 97.02% prediction accuracy and 1.24% false
negative. Logistic regression and neural network perform close to decision tree. However,
they are not as easily explainable as decision tree.
Considering that there are some recent work on rationalizing neural networks, we
adapted and implemented a neural network model with reason generator [35] to have a
comprehensive comparison with decision tree. The details of adaptation and implementation
are omitted due to the space limitation and will provided in an extended version of this paper.
As shown in Fig. 2.11, the performance of neural network with reason generator is not as
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good as decision tree. We then compare decision tree and neural network model in the reason
code generated. The average length of reason codes generated by decision tree is about 4,
while the average length of neural network is around 8.5. When reason codes are sufficient
to support predictions, shorter reason codes are much better and easier to interpret/verify.
Thus the reason codes of decision are easier to verify.
2.5.9 Remediation Analysis Delay and Cost
Delay of remediation decision analysis Here, we analyze the time saved by au-
tomating the decision analysis for OrgA. We first compute the time required by the machine
learning-based framework. The vulnerability analysis and decision prediction time is in mil-
lisecond scale, which can be negligible. When the machine learning model is dynamically
trained, it will require operators to verify 10% vulnerability predictions as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.5.5. The average time of prediction verification is 28.8 seconds as shown in Section
2.5.4. For the 3476 vulnerabilities in the year covered by the 2017A dataset, the average
verification time for OrgA is 2.3 personal hours per month (which is the typical decision
cycle). Suppose there is only one operator. This can be completed within 2.3 hours, making
the decision delay 2.3 hours.
Based on the test in Section 2.5.4, the average time of manually analyzing each
vulnerability is 7 minutes. The total manual analysis time for OrgA is 33.8 person hours per
month. Again, suppose there is only one operator. Theoretically, this task can be completed
in 33.8 hours, making the decision delay 33.8 hours. However, in practice, when the time
needed for a task is long, the total time span of completing the task will be more than simply
the person hours. Human operators cannot work 24 hours a day like a machine and may take
a rest now and then, need perform some other duties such as meeting and reporting, and
can be distracted by other things like chatting with each other. Also, electric utilities like
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OrgA usually hold weekly meetings among security operators to perform remediation decision
analysis. All of these factors can generate extra delay of remediation decision making. That
might make the analysis process span across days and even weeks. This is validated by our
survey described in Section 2.2, where 50% of participants indicated it takes them more than
16 days to complete remediation action analysis for each cycle.
According to this sketch analysis, the delay of completing remediation decision anal-
ysis with machine learning could be hours, but the delay with manual decision making could
be days and even weeks. When remediation decisions for vulnerabilities can be made ear-
lier, those high-risk vulnerabilities (that need to be patched now or mitigated now) can be
identified earlier and hence remediated earlier, which will greatly reduce the security risks of
electric utilities. Hence, utilities using our machine learning framework will face much less
risks.
Cost of remediation decision analysis Since the VPM problem for security oper-
ations is one of human resource allocation, we analyze the personnel cost saving brought by
machine learning. From the above delay analysis, it can be seen that with machine learning
31.5 person hours can be saved each month for OrgA. That results in 378 person hours of
saving per year. For larger utilities with more assets, the saving is even more. For example,
in our survey, one participant company indicates it has 12,000 vulnerabilities per year. That
would make the total saving to 1,305 person hours.
2.6 Related Work
There are many VPM solutions available for corporate use, such as GFI LanGuard
[48], Patch Manager Plus by ManageEngine [9], and Patch Manager by SolarWinds [49].
However, these solutions focus on vulnerability discovery and deployment of patches rather
than the decisions necessary to optimize resources for vulnerability remediation. Most so-
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lutions designed for VPM in electric utilities also fall into this category, such as Doble
Engineering’s PatchAssure [12], Flexera [13], or FoxGuard Solutions [50]. They are unable
to analyze vulnerabilities against the operating environment and make prioritized decisions
on how to address vulnerabilities.
When addressing vulnerabilities, there are some publicly-available sources of infor-
mation. The NIST NVD [54] provides a well-structured, reliable data feed of vulnerabilities
and their corresponding information as they are reported. Vulners [61] has a freely-accessible
API to search vulnerability information and discover available exploits; the Exploit Database
[11] also allows users to search for available exploits. Tenable [58] has recently released a
tool which provides predictive analysis for exploitability of a security vulnerability. This tool
focuses on the exploit features whereas we explore the relationship between the vulnerability
and the asset to which it applies. The exploitability from the Tenable tool could be used as
one feature of our machine learning framework.
There is also academic research on this topic. [46] and [14] analyze large vulnerabil-
ity datasets and report trends in vulnerability characteristics, and disclosure and discovery
dates. [36], [5], and [41] analyze patches and patch behavior, such as the windows of time
between when patches are released and when they are installed or the effectiveness of a
patch protecting against a vulnerability. [3], [60], and [62] describe approaches for priori-
tizing vulnerability patching based on the calculated severity of an exploit. [33] and [47]
analyze the risks of network attacks based on attack graph. However, these works do not
combine vulnerability metrics with organizations’ unique environment to analyze vulnera-
bility remediation decisions. Machine learning has been applied to discover vulnerability in
software and source code [64] [19] [16] [1] [45] [67], but our work uses vulnerability features
with asset information to determine how to remediate vulnerabilities.
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2.7 Discussions
Even though the proposed framework has only been tested on electric utilities, being
consistent with the DHS guideline, it is general and can be applied to many other orga-
nizations especially critical infrastructures, which suffer from similar VPM challenges and
constraints. The way of applying the framework to other organizations is similar to the appli-
cation on electric utilities, but the identified asset features and remediation decisions might
be different. In future work, we will test our framework on other types of organizations.
In some cases, operation contexts might affect remediation actions. For example,
when one vulnerability outbreaks and makes to headlines (e.g., the Meltdown vulnerabil-
ity), a company’s administrators might want it to be remediated as soon as possible due to
pressure from public reputation. Then operators might choose Patch-Now or Mitigate-Now-
Patch-Later instead of Patch Later, even if the decision tree prediction based on vulnerabil-
ity/asset features is Patch Later. In such cases, operators can use their decisions to override
decision tree predictions. We will explore inclusion of such operation contexts in automation
in future work.
2.8 Summary
This chapter addressed the need for more effective decision support to address VPM
challenges and proposed a decision tree based framework to automate the analysis remedi-
ation decisions for vulnerabilities. We tested an instance of the framework customized for
one electric utility over two datasets obtained from the utility. Results showed high predic-
tion accuracy and time savings. These results demonstrate the value in applying machine
learning to automate VPM processes. Even though the framework is only tested in electric
utilities, it can easily adapt to other critical infrastructures.
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3 Remediation Action Scheduling Optimization
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we have developed a machine learning method to predict how to ad-
dress the newly discovered vulnerabilities. Every month, hundreds or even thousands of
vulnerabilities to be remediated. However, not all vulnerabilities can be remediated quickly
due to limited resources. It is important to carefully schedule the remediation order so that
the total risk is minimal.
In this chapter, we will schedule the patching orders by considering vulnerabilities’
impact and their probabilities of being exploited. One vulnerability’s risk is affected by its
impact on the system and its probability of being exploited. A vulnerability is becoming
more and more likely to be exploited after it is discovered, which means the probability of
being exploited is changing over time. Thus the vulnerability’s risk is also changing over
time. We will first predict probability p(t) that each vulnerability is exploited at time t with
neural network method, and calculate each vulnerability’s risk r(t) over time t based on its
impact and p(t). Then we will model this as an Mixed Integer Programs (MIP) problem to
automatically derive optimal patch schedules.
3.2 Approach
The patching order can significantly affect the risk that the system is facing. As an
example, a system has two vulnerabilities to remediate Va and Vb. Assume Va’s impact score
is 9.5 with probability 0.6 of being exploited and Vb’s impact score is 6.0 with probability
0.8 of being exploited. It takes about 2 hours to patch Va and 0.5 hour to patch Vb. If we
prioritize the patches only by impact score, Va will be first patched. Then the risk from Va
is: 9.5*0.6*2, the risk from Vb is 6.0*0.8*2.5 and total risk is 23.4. If Vb is patched first, the
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total risk is 16.65. Changing the patching order can significantly reduce the risk. In this
section, we describe the approach to get optimal patching scheduling order by considering
vulnerability impact, probability of being exploited and patching time. We will first predict
the vulnerabilities’ exploitability and then schedule the patching order.
3.2.1 Risk Metric
Here we will first describe how we measure the risk that a vulnerability poses to the
system. Each vulnerability comes with Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) met-
rics, which shows the principal characteristics of the vulnerability and produce a numerical
score reflecting its severity [10]. CVSS score can be used to quantify a vulnerability risk.
However, it does not capture a vulnerability’s probability of being exploited as time goes
by, which only shows the risk at the time point when the vulnerability is published. Here
we will define a new metric to quantify a vulnerability’s risk by combining the vulnerability
impact on the system and its probability of being exploited as stated in [56] [32]:
r(t) = I ∗ p(t) (3.1)
r(t) is the risk of a vulnerability at time t, I is the impact score on the system and p(t) is
the probability to be exploited at time point t. The impact score can be calculated based on
CVSS scoring system, where I = 10.41 ∗ (1− (1−ConfImpact) ∗ (1− IntegImpact) ∗ (1−
AvailImpact)) as described in [27]. ConfImpact, IntegImpact, and AvailImpact are three
characteristics defined in CVSS metrics to show the vulnerability’s confidentiality, integrity
and availability impact on the system respectively. Each characteristic has three different
impact level, ’complete’, ’partial’ and ’none’. When its value is ’complete’, it is numeralized
as 0.660, ’partial’ is numeralized as 0.275, and ’None’ is numeralized as 0.0.
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3.2.2 Exploitability Prediction
If a vulnerability is exploitable, it means that there are available exploit codes to
leverage the vulnerability to launch attacks. The exploit can be released any time after
or even before a vulnerability is newly disclosed. Knowing how soon the vulnerabilities is
likely to be exploited can help in scheduling when to patch the vulnerability. In this section,
we will predict the probability of a vulnerability to be exploited in the nth day since it is
published with feed forward neural network (FFNN).
Figure 3.1: Distribution of vulnerabilities’ exploited day after being published
We collected 67965 vulnerabilities from Vulners database [61], 46380 out of which
have no exploits, 17260 already have exploits before vulnerabilities are published, and 4325
vulnerabilities are exploited after they are published. For these vulnerabilities whose ex-
ploits are released before they are published, it is not necessary to do prediction since their
exploitability are already known. We only need predict the 4325 vulnerabilities whose ex-
ploits are unavailable when they are published. The vulnerability exploitability distribution
is shown in Fig. 3.1. The X axis shows in which day the vulnerability is exploited after
being published and the Y axis shows the number of vulnerabilities exploited in that day.
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For example, about 250 vulnerabilities are exploited in day 7th or 8th after being published
and around 2000 vulnerabilities are exploited after 100 days. To keep the dataset’s balance,
we aslo randomly sampled 4325 vulnerabilities from the unexploitable vulnerabilities as the
experiment dataset, which will be used as training data to train the neural network model.
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Feature Extraction: To train the neural network model, we need select import fea-
tures to represent each vulnerability. CVSS metric is used as features which are attack vector,
attack complexity, user privilege, user interaction, integrity, availability, confidentiality and
CVSS score. Common weakness enumeration (CWE) which shows the vulnerability type,
and software name are also used as features. Each vulnerability has its description and title
which also provide valuable information. Since descriptions and titles are descriptive texts,
we will apply tf-idf (term frequency- inverse document frequency) [59] to extract important
words from description and title texts as features. Tf-idf is able to identify important words
and deprive stop words (e.g. the) and common words appearing in most descriptions or
titles such as “CVE”. We extract bi-grams as features, which has better performances than
uni-gram in this prediction task. 8500 bi-grams are extracted from descriptions and 1470 bi-
grams from titles. Then we apply random forest to select top 3000 most important features
from descriptions such as “windows server”, “execute arbitrary”, “verify certificates”, “spoof
servers”, “access restriction” and top 500 most important features from titles. Besides, each
vulnerability has publish date, modify date and last seen date. The time differences between
modify and publish date, last seen date and publish date are highly related to exploitability.
Thus we also take the time difference between modify date and publish date, and difference
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between last seen date and publish date used as features. The feature number is shown in
Table 3.1.
Exploitability Prediction with Neural Network: The historical vulnerability
data can be used as the training data to train the FFNN model. When a new vulnerabil-
ity is published, it can be fed into the trained FFNN model which will predict when the
vulnerability will be exploited and provide the probability of being exploited on each day.
When we predict the exploitability probability of nth after being published, we will relabel
the training dataset so that the vulnerabilities which are exploited under n day are labeled
as 1 and the ones which are exploited over n day or unexploitable are labeled as 0. Then
this relabeled dataset is used to train a model and this model can provide the probability of
being exploited in nth day.
3.2.3 Patch Schedule Optimization
Different vulnerabilities have different probabilities of being exploited and risk level
on each day. It is necessary to schedule which vulnerabilities should be patched first so that
the total risk that the system is facing is as low as possible. In this section, we will model
the problem as an Mixed Integer Programming problem (MIP), which is a mathematical
optimization problem in which some or all of the variables are integers, and discuss how to
get the optimal patching order with optimization algorithm.
Let vi denote vulnerability i, pi(t) denote the probability of being exploited for vul-
nerability vi over time t, Ii denote impact score of vi, and di denote execution delay to
process patch i. Our objective is to schedule the patch order so that the total risk that a
system is facing is as low as possible. The risk of an unpatched vulnerability at time t is r(t)
as defined in Equation 3.1. Since a vulnerability cannot be exploited after it is patched, this
vulnerability will not pose any risk to the system. Thus the total risk caused by a vulnerabil-
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where si is the time point when patch starts. In order to model this as an MIP problem
and apply optimization algorithm, we convert this formula to discrete calculation which is:∑t=si+di
t=0 ri(t). In this work, we consider 30 minutes as a unit, di = 2 means it takes 2 time
units to complete patch, which is 60 minutes. si =10 means starting patch at time unit 10,




t=0 ri(t). The goal is
to minimize the total risk that unpatched vulnerabilities pose to the system.
In practice, assets are divided into different asset groups based on the assets’ functions
and physical locations for easier management as we discussed in Chapter 2.3.2. Operators
need coordinate to schedule downtime for machines before applying patches. Thus, once an
asset group’s machines are scheduled down, all the patches applicable to the asset group
will be applied in succession. Thus this optimization problem can be implemented into
two phases. In the first phase, we will take one asset group’s vulnerabilities as a task
and determine which group should be patched first. In the second phase, schedule the
vulnerability patching order for each group.
Phase I: Asset group patching order optimization: In this phase, each asset
group is taken as one task. We use Rj(t) to denote the risk of all vulnerabilities in asset
group j over time t and Dj is the execution delay to process all vulnerabilities in asset group
j, where Rj(t) =
∑i=nj
i=0 ri(t) and Dj =
∑i=nj
i=0 di. nj is the vulnerability number in asset
group j. In an organization, there are usually several operators to apply patches. And one
operator can be responsible for one or several asset groups, but he can only work on one
patch at a time. We use X(j,a) to denote that asset group j is assigned to operator a. The
asset group scheduling optimization problem can be formulated as:
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Inputs:
J set of all asset groups j ∈ J in the organization
A set of all available operators a ∈ A to apply patches
Dj execution delay to process all patches in asset group j
Rj(t) risk of all vulnerabilities in asset group j
Sj scheduled start time of asset group j
X(j,a) allocation of asset group j, X(j,a) = 1 if operator a is assigned to asset group j;
otherwise 0, X(j,a) = 0
θ(j,k) support variable used to determine whether the processing time of asset group j
and k are overlapped for each operator. θ(j,k) = 1 if asset group k is started before j is












a∈AX(j,a) = 1 (each patch must be assigned once to exactly one operator)
• Sk >= Sj +Dj (a patch cannot start until its predecessor are completed)
• X(j,a) + X(k,a) + θ(j,k) + θ(k,j) <= 3 (if asset group j and k are assigned to the same
operator, their execution times cannot overlap)
Phase II: Patching order optimization in each asset group: After getting the
asset group patching order in first phase, we will schedule the patching order for each group.
We can get each asset group’s patch start time Sj from first phase’s scheduling. Then all
the applicable vulnerabilities in this asset group should be patched after Sj. The formulated
optimization algorithm is described as following:
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for each asset group do:
Inputs:
I set of applicable vulnerabilities i ∈ I in the asset group
di execution delay to process vulnerability i
ri(t) risk of vulnerability i
si scheduled start time of vulnerability i
θ(i,k) support variable used to determine whether the processing time of vulnerability i









• θ(i,k) = 1 (a patch cannot start until other is completed)
• si >= Sj (vulnerabilities can be patched after its asset group start time Sj)
3.3 Evaluation
3.3.1 Evaluation on Exploitability Prediction
Figure 3.2: Exploitability Prediction
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The dataset used in this experiment consists of 8650 vulnerabilities, half of which are
exploited and half are unexploited. We split the dataset into two part: 67% as training data
and the remaining as testing data. We implemented the FFNN model with Python sklearn.
We first test the performance of exploitability prediction without considering which day the
vulnerabilities are exploited. No matter whether the vulnerability is exploited in the first
day or in 500th day after being published, it will be labeled as exploited. The prediction
accuracy is shown in Fig. 3.2. It has 89.6% prediction accuracy and the true positive (TP)
is 89.7%. The true negative (TN), false negative (FP) and false positive (FP) are 89.3%,
10.3%, and 10.7% respectively.
Then we test the performance of predictions on which day the vulnerability will be
predicted. For each day’s exploitability prediction, the dataset is relabeled as discussed
in Section 3.2.2 and then used to train a specific neural network model for this day. The
prediction accuracy is shown in Table 3.2. As the time goes by, the prediction accuracy is
becoming better. For example, the prediction for 1st day is 74.7%, and the prediction for
30th day is 82.0%. This is because the longer the time after being published is, the more
vulnerabilities are exploited. Thus the training dataset is becoming larger, the model will
be better trained and its performance will also become better.
The FFNN model also predicts the probability of being exploited p(t) in each day.
We give two examples of two vulnerabilities (vi and vk) predicted probabilities of being
exploited which are shown in Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4. The X axis shows the nth day after
being published and Y axis means the probability of being exploited at that very day. In
reality, vi was exploited in the eighth day after being published and vk was exploited in the
sixth day after being published. From the predicted result shown in the figures, it can be seen
that vi’s probability of being exploited is around 0.5 in 8th day and vk’s predicted probability
in 6th day is around 0.6. The predicted probabilities can imply when the vulnerabilities will
42
Table 3.2: Exploiting time prediction
Day Accuracy TP FN TN FP
1 0.747 0.742 0.258 0.753 0.247
2 0.783 0.772 0.228 0.795 0.205
3 0.784 0.768 0.232 0.803 0.197
4 0.799 0.788 0.212 0.810 0.190
5 0.801 0.789 0.211 0.814 0.186
6 0.802 0.789 0.211 0.818 0.182
8 0.804 0.784 0.216 0.827 0.173
10 0.809 0.809 0.191 0.808 0.192
15 0.816 0.801 0.199 0.834 0.166
20 0.812 0.81 0.19 0.818 0.182
30 0.820 0.819 0.181 0.821 0.179
5000 0.896 0.898 0.102 0.893 0.107
be exploited.
Figure 3.3: Predicted probability of vul-
nerability vi
Figure 3.4: Predicted probability of vul-
nerability vk
3.3.2 Evaluation on Patch Scheduling
In this section, we will test how our patch scheduling optimization method performs.
The scheduling optimization problem is implemented with around 2000 lines of Python
codes by using OR-Tools library, which is developed by Google for optimization problems
[43]. In order to know how our optimization method performs, we compare it with other
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two commonly used patching methods in practice, patching randomly and patching based
on CVSS score (patch vulnerabilities with higher CVSS score first). Both methods are
implemented in Python. For the patching randomly method, we randomly select which
asset group should be patched first and then for each asset group, randomly determine the
vulnerabilities’ patching order. For the CVSS score-based patching method, add all the
applicable vulnerabilities’ CVSS score up for each asset group and patch the asset group
with higher CVSS score first. Then for each asset group, determine patch order based on
CVSS score.
We compare these three method through three metrics. The first metric is the total
amount of risks that unpatched vulnerabilities pose to the system, which can be calculated as∑n
i=0
∑si+di
t=0 ri(t), and n is the number of all vulnerabilities. The second metric is the number
of the vulnerabilities that are patched before being exploited. For those vulnerabilities
which are not patched before being exploited, we will calculate the time difference between
the patching time and exploited time to see how long the system is exposed to the exploited
vulnerabilities, which can be calculated as
∑
i tpatch time−texploit time if tpatch time > texploit time,
where tpatch time is the patching time and texploit time is the exploited time.
Figure 3.5: Total amount of
risks of unpatched vulnerabil-
ities under one operator
Figure 3.6: Number of
vulnerabilities patched before
exploited under one operator
Figure 3.7: Time difference
between patch time and ex-
ploit time if patched after ex-
ploited under one operator
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We use the real data, the installed software and asset group information, from the util-
ity company OrgA as the testing data. We extracted 390 applicable vulnerabilities published
in January 2019 through the software names. Then we predict the exploiting probability
for these retrieved vulnerabilities with our trained neural network model. Then we run our
scheduling optimization algorithm to get optimal patching order. There are totally 26 asset
groups in the testing data.
We first test the performances when there is only one operator in the organization.
The results are shown in Fig. 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. It can be seen that our optimization method
performs much better than the other two method. The total amount risks can be reduced
from 686322 to 262548 when compared with CVSS-based method and from 914043 to 262548
when compared with randomly patch method. The risk is decreased by at least 60%. Our
scheduling method can patch 299 vulnerabilities before being exploited, while CVSS-based
and randomly patching methods can patch 252 and 228 vulnerabilities. For these vulnera-
bilities that are not patched before exploited, they should be patch as soon as possible. Fig.
3.7 shows that our method expose the system to the exploited vulnerabilities for the shortest
time, which is 1636 hours less than CVSS-based method and 1143 hours less than randomly
patching method.
Figure 3.8: Total amount of risks of unpatched vulnerabilities under multiple operators
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Then we test the performances when there are multiple operators in one organiza-
tions. The results are shown in Fig. 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. With more operators, the total risk
becomes less because more patches can processed earlier and timely. The results show that
our optimization method perform much better than the other two methods under multiple
operators.
Figure 3.9: Number of vulnerabilities patched before exploited under multiple operators




To the best of our knowledge, there is no work to schedule the patching order by
considering the vulnerabilities’ dynamic probabilities of being exploited so that the total
risk that a power system is facing is minimal. There have been some work about patching
prioritization. The work in [15] prioritized the vulnerability remediation by quantifying the
vulnerabilities’ risk based on CVSS temporal and environmental scores. The work in [23]
prioritized the vulnerabilities with two security metrics, system risk and attack cost. The
work in [17] [39] [4] determine the patching order through game theory in an attack/defense
scenario. These works do not consider the vulnerabilities’ dynamic nature and the probability
of being exploited is changing over time. They assume that a vulnerability’s risk to a system
is constant, and thus the patching order does not guarantee the system’s total risk is minimal.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a method about how to schedule the patching order to
reduce the risk that vulnerabilities pose to the system. We first predict the vulnerabilities’
probability of being exploited over time. Each vulnerability’s risk can be calculated based on
its impact score on the system and the predicted probability. Then we model the scheduling
problem as MIP and get the optimized scheduling patching order so that the total risk is
minimum. The evaluation based on a utility company’s real data shows our method can
significantly reduce the risk.
This method is the following step of the work in Chapter 2. After we determine
how to address the vulnerabilities (patch, mitigating, patch later), we can first apply the
optimization method on the group of vulnerabilities that need to be patched and mitigated,
to determine the patching and mitigation order. Then we can apply this method on the
47
vulnerabilities that can be patched later and get their optimized scheduling order.
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4 Identifying Exploited Vulnerabilities through Data Forgery Attack Detection
and Localization
4.1 Introduction
It is important for electric utilities to know whether some vulnerabilities have already
been exploited specifically for their power system to help them better schedule remediation
actions. For example, if a vulnerability is exploited, it has to be remediated immediately.
Different vulnerabilities may require different identification methods. Here, we explore iden-
tifying exploited vulnerabilities by detecting and localizing false data injection attacks and
give a case study in the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) system.
AGC is a key control system in the power grid which aims to keep balance between
power generation and load and maintain a stable power system frequency. It automatically
adjusts power generation in response to area control imbalance. In AGC, a control center
periodically collects the power system’s frequency and tie-line power flow measurements
from meters to calculate Area Control Error (ACE) and change the set-point of the generator
governors participating in AGC based on the calculated ACE. If malicious tie-line power flow
or frequency data is injected to normal measurement to mislead AGC to do miscalculations,
AGC may issue wrong commands based on the miscalculated ACEs.
False data can be injected to the system in two ways. One way is to directly inject
the false data packets to the communication network channel. However, such attacks can be
easily detected by authentication techniques. The other way is to compromise and control the
devices such as meters to launch such attacks. If there are some unaddressed vulnerabilities
existing in a device, attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities to compromise the device.
The increasing number of smart devices in the power grid and the connection to external
networks make this way more feasible. If the false injected data are carefully designed,
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existing methods implemented in control centers such as State Estimation (SE) and Bad
Data Detection (BDD) [18] are unable to detect intelligent cyber attacks. The work in [63]
has shown that the existing schemes can be bypassed by carefully designed false data injection
attacks.
If the attacks can be detected and localized, we will know which devices and vulner-
abilities are exploited, and thus can better prioritize the vulnerability remediation. In this
work, we propose Neural Network-based and Fourier Transform-based approaches to detect
and localize false data injection attacks in AGC. In the first approach, we adopt Long Short
Term Memory (LSTM) neural network to learn ACE patterns from historical data, predict
ACE sequence pattern for next detection window based on the learned patterns, compare
the predictions with the corresponding ACE sequence pattern calculated from measurements
to determine whether there is forged data in the sequence. The LSTM model can be built
with single feature: the historical ACE data (single-feature LSTM). It can also include more
related features (i.e. multi-feature LSTM), such as frequency and tie-line power flow, to
achieve better performance. The LSTM-based approach is also developed to localize at-
tacks by checking which measurement is abnormal so that we can know which meter is
compromised. In the second approach, we convert ACE and measurement data from the
time domain to the frequency domain by using Fourier Transform and then check if ACE
data is normal in the frequency domain. We test these approaches on both simulated and
real datasets. Since we only use historical data that are already available in current AGC
systems, our detection methods can be easily deployed without interrupting normal services.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the AGC system model
and five attack models considered in this paper. Section 4.3 describes the proposed detection
and localization methods. Section 4.4 presents the simulated system and simulated and real
dataset. Section 4.5 shows the performance of the proposed methods on both simulated
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dataset and real dataset. Section 4.6 discusses related work about false data injection attack
detection in AGC. The last section concludes this paper.
4.2 Preliminary
4.2.1 AGC System
For a control area, AGC is used to adjust power generation to maintain the frequency
at the scheduled value. AGC is an automated control system and its workflow is illustrated
in Fig. 4.1. It periodically (every 2-4 seconds) receives the measurements of frequency from
this control area and tie-line power flows between this area and neighboring areas from field
devices, and calculates the ACE according to the equation
ACE = (Ptielie − Psch) +B(f − fsch) (4.1)
where Ptielie and fsch are the scheduled tie-line power flow and the scheduled frequency
respectively. B is the frequency bias factor, which is constant for each power system and is
estimated annually. Then AGC adjusts the power generation of generators according to the
obtained ACE.
Figure 4.1: AGC System
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4.2.2 Attack Models
To cause miscalculations of ACEs, attackers can inject false data to frequency mea-
surements or tie-line power flow measurements. Normally, ACE is within a specific range.
Once ACE exceeds the limit, an alarm will be triggered to human operators and the AGC
may be suspended [30]. If the attacker injects a significant attack to the measurements, it
might be detected by SE or BDD, or trigger the alarm. Thus the attacker might only mod-
ify the measurements slightly so that the attacks are not detected. However, one stealthily
forged data measurement may not be enough to introduce significant impact to the power
grid. According to [57], the shortest time to stealthily mislead the system frequency to
breach the safety condition without triggering AGC suspension is at least 10 AGC cycles,
which means that in order to achieve expected effects, the attacker needs to inject a series
of false data to indirectly control the generator for a period of time.
One way to launch stealthy attacks is to find the maximum and minimum values
of normal frequency or tie-line power flow measurements and then inject the minimum or
maximum data into the measurements. Since the maximum and minimum values are still
within normal range, they will be trusted by AGC. In this work, these two types of attacks
will be explored. Let Ta represent the attack period, t represent time, t0 represent the time
point when the attacker starts an attack, y(t) represent the true measurement (which could
be either frequency or tie-line power flow as discussed later) value without attacks, and y∗(t)
represent the measurement value with possible attacks.




y(t), if t /∈ Ta
ymax, if t ∈ Ta
(4.2)





y(t), if t /∈ Ta
ymin, if t ∈ Ta
(4.3)
In addition to the Max and Min attacks, we also consider three attack models which
are also explored in [51, 24]: scaling attack, ramp attack, and random attack. In these
attack models, the attacker keeps launching attacks until achieving expected results. The
three attack models can be described as follows.
Scale Attack: The attack scales measurement values up or down by multiplying
with a scaling parameter λs.
y∗(t) =
{
y(t), if t /∈ Ta
y(t)+λs · y(t), if t ∈ Ta
(4.4)
Ramp Attack: The attack gradually modifies measurements by adding λr(t − t0).
λr is a ramping parameter. This type of attack is more difficult to detect because it has very
small and unnoticeable changes at the beginning of the attack period.
y∗(t) =
{
y(t), if t /∈ Ta
y(t)+λr(t− t0), if t ∈ Ta
(4.5)
Random Attack: The attack modifies measurement values by adding some random
values in a range with lower bound λa and upper bound λb during the attack period.
y∗(t) =
{
y(t), if t /∈ Ta
y(t)+rand(λa, λb), if t ∈ Ta
(4.6)
For the same power system, the higher the attack parameters λ are, the more signifi-
cant the attacks are. However, attacks with same parameters may have different impacts on
different power systems. For example, for two different power system A and B, the average
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ACE of A is 800MW while B’s average ACE is 40MW. If a random attack within range
(0, 40) attacks system A and B, it only change A’s ACE by 5% while change B’s ACE by
100%.
4.3 Detection Methods






Figure 4.2: Structure of Recurrent Neural Network
Based on the dataset observations, the ACE data of a control area have some patterns
determined by the physical configuration of the AGC system (e.g., how ACE responds to
load changes). Fig. 4.4 shows the ACE data pattern of 250 cycles from the real dataset
PJM [44]. From the figure, it can be seen that the ACE data has similar patterns. For
example, the data sequence pattern from cycle 0 to 49 is similar to the sequence pattern
from cycle 50 to 100. If an attacker injects artificial data into AGC, the resulted ACE
patterns will be different. Therefore, we can detect attacks through checking whether there
are ACE data patterns that deviate from the normal patterns. Following this idea, we use
neural network to learn the normal pattern of ACE time series and use it to detect attacks.
To determine whether the pattern of the current data sequence is normal or has appeared
before, the neural network model need have the ability to link the current observations with
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the past observations. Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) is designed to deal with data with
dependency [40], whose structure is show in Fig. 4.2. RNN can be regarded as multiple
copies of the same neural network which are connected successively. The output of a neural
network will be passed to its successor. Xt−1 is the data at time point t− 1 and its output
data ht−1 will be passed to next neural network and taken as the input together with Xt.
The output is calculated as: ht = σ(WhXt +Uhht−1 + b), where Wh, Uh, b are the parameters
and σ is the activation function in the neural network. In such way, the RNN model allows

















Figure 4.3: Structure of Long Short Term Memory Network
However, RNN is not good at addressing long-term dependency. As the time sequence
moves forward, the previous information carried by the neural network will become less
and less, and eventually vanish. However, in our problem, we need to find what patterns
the current observations follow, which requires the neural network remember and relate
to previous patterns even far from current time point. In order to solve the long-term
dependency problem, Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) [21] is adopted, whose structure
is shown in Fig. 4.3.
Different from RNN, in LSTM, ’forget gate’ and ’input gate’ are added in each neural
network chunk. The forget gate is to decide what information need to discard. The input
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gate is to decide what new information are going to be stored. Thus these gates helps remove
useless information while remember useful information for a long period of time. As shown
in Fig. 4.3, not only ht−1 is passed to next neural network, but also Ct−1. Ct is a memory
cell to store remembered information. The output ht and Ct are calculated as follows:
ft = σ(WfXt + Ufht−1 + bf )
it = σ(WiXt + Uiht−1 + bi)
C ′ = tanh(WcXt + Ucht−1 + bc)
Ot = σ(WoXt + Uoht−1 + bo)
Ct = Ct−1 ∗ ft + it ∗ C ′
ht = Ot ∗ tanh(Ct)
(4.7)
Where W,U, b are the neural network weight parameters. The important information
will flow through the memory cell Ct. For our problem, LSTM is able to remember and find
what previous sequence pattern that the current sequence resembles or is similar to. Then
it can predict the next data sequence pattern based on the resembled pattern as well as the
future measurements.
4.3.2 LSTM-based Detection Method
Our experiments on the PJM dataset show that the LSTM model trained by historical
ACE time series data is able to make very accurate predictions for the next ACE sequence.
We split the PJM ACE data into two parts, training data and testing data. Then training
dataset (size: 1 million records) is used to train the model and then the testing dataset is
fed into the model to do the prediction for each data point. The prediction results are shown
in Fig. 4.5. The red ones are predicted data which fits the real data (blue ones) very well.
Since the LSTM model has such high prediction accuracy, we can compare the predicted
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Figure 4.4: ACE data pattern Figure 4.5: Prediction with LSTM
ACE sequence with the measured ACE sequence to detect abnormal measurements. In each
comparison, we calculate the distance between a predicted ACE data sequence with the
corresponding measured ACE sequence by using Manhattan Similarity.
Single-Feature LSTM: we can only use past ACE data as features, which is Xt =
{ACEt}, and learn ACE patterns with LSTM model from historical ACE data, as we pro-
posed in our previous work [65]. The experiments showed that this method has promising
results on random and ramp attacks, but does not perform well on scale attack detection
since scale attacks do not change ACE patterns, just scaling ACE values up and down.
Multi-Feature LSTM: in the single-feature LSTM model, only historical ACE are
utilized to make predictions. Actually, in addition to past ACEs, the future ACE value
also depends on frequency and tie-line power flow measurement value according to Equation
4.1. Furthermore, the frequency and tie-line power flow are affected by the variance between
real load and power generation as we introduced in 4.1. And power generation amount is
determined by forecast load. Thus the ACE values are closely related to frequency, tie-line
power flow, real load and forecast load values. In order to predict ACE more accurately, we
will consider these four factors in addition to past ACE data. The input of each time point
is Xt = {ft, Pt, Rt, Lt, ACEt}, where ft, Pt, Rt, Lt, ACEt are the frequency, tie-line power
flow, real load, forecast load and ACE at time point t respectively.
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In particular, the LSTM model is first trained with historical data and can be updated
dynamically (e.g., every day or every week) to include the newly generated data. We can
feed the input data sequence into the trained model to do the prediction. The length of
the input data sequence can be adjusted based on the datasets to achieve better prediction
results. Suppose the input length is m, and Xt is the t time point data. Xt can be single
feature {ACEt} or multiple features {ft, Pt, Rt, Lt, ACEt}. We use the input data sequence
(X(t+1), X(t+2), . . . , X(t+m)) to predict X(t+m+1). When predicted data sequence with n data
points is available, it is compared with the measured data sequence at the same time points
to check whether the measured data sequence deviates significantly from it. The detailed
steps of the method are shown as follows which are run every n ACE cycles.
Step 1: Predict the next data sequence with the trained model.
Xt−m+1, Xt−m+2, ..., Xt → X̂t+1
Xt−m+2, Xt−m+3, ..., Xt+1 → X̂t+2
...
Xt−m+n, Xt−m+n+1, ..., Xt+n−1 → X̂t+n








Step 3: Compare the distance with threshold θ. It is normal data if the distance is less than the
threshold d < θ. Otherwise, it is regarded as attacked data.
4.3.3 LSTM-based Attack localization
After detecting existence of attacks, it is also desired to know where the attacks come
from or which sensor is compromised. In the detection method, we detect attacks by finding
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abnormal ACE patterns. Following this idea, we can also detect which measurement is
attacked by checking the measurements’ patterns. To localize attacks, we not only predict
ACE values, but also predict the frequency and tie-line power flow value through the LSTM
model. When abnormal ACE data is detected, we will compare the predicted frequency and














If df or dP is larger than the thresholds, it means this measurement is under attack.
4.3.4 Fourier Transform-based Method Detection and Localization
The single-feature LSTM-based method cannot detect scale attacks effectively since
the scale attack just scales the data’s value up or down and does not change the data sequence
patterns. We propose another method, Fourier Transform-based detection, to complement
single-feature LSTM-based detection.
Figure 4.6: Moving Average of Normal
ACE and ACE with Scale Attack
















Fourier Transform of normal moving average
Fourier Transform of moving average with scale attack
Figure 4.7: Fourier Transform of Moving
Average with scale attacks
Fourier Transform [7] can convert data from time domain to frequency domain to
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observe data patterns. The moving average is the average of its previous m data to smooth
fluctuations and highlight patterns which can make data sequence patterns more obvious.
Thus we can calculate the moving average of data and then covert its moving average to
frequency domain to observe patterns. If some unexpected changes occur, these can also be
reflected on moving average. The moving average of attacked ACEs and normal ones are
shown in Fig. 4.6. The blue line shows normal data’s moving average and the red one is
the moving average with the scale attack (λs = 0.2) when the length of one attack period
is 10 AGC cycles. It can be seen that the patterns of moving average is more obvious and
attacked data’s moving average is more fluctuated than the normal ones.
In this method, we first calculate moving average for each 10-data sequence, then
convert the moving average to frequency domain and get the minimum transformed value
(MTV) of each sequence. As shown in Fig. 4.7, the MTVs have significant differences. The
MTV of normal moving average is around 0.0 while the ones with scale attack is around -0.2.
The attacked MTVs can be separated from normal ones by setting a threshold. If a data
sequence’s MTV is larger than the threshold, it is normal data. Otherwise, it is regarded
as attacked data. Such threshold can be set by observing the differences between MTVs of
attacked data and normal data.
To localize attacks, we also perform same Fourier Transformation on tie-line power
line and frequency measurements. Then we can set a threshold to check whether the mea-
surements’ converted MTV values are under attack.
4.4 Simulation System and Dataset
4.4.1 Simulation System
We simulated a 5-bus power system [38] as shown in Fig. 4.8, which is a typical
power system with two interconnected control areas. The two control areas are connected
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Figure 4.8: 5-bus system with 2 control areas
by two tie-lines. Area I contains buses 1, 2 and 4, and Area II contains buses 3 and 5. Bus
4 and Bus 5 are the load buses for Control Area I and Area II respectively. Buses 1-3 are
generator buses. Area I is equipped with two generators and Area II is equipped with one
generator. The power system dynamics are modeled by using the structure-preserving load
model [26], [6] and the well-known generator model with governor control [25].
Each control area is equipped with its own AGC, which sits in the control center. The
control center periodically collects frequency and tie-line flow measurements, then check the
measurements with SE method, and then pass the measurements to AGC. AGC calculates
ACE based on the measurement with Eq. (4.1) and then dispatches new set-points to
generators.
4.4.2 Simulation Dataset
We simulated the system with real load consumption data used at the load buses.
That way, realistic ACE patterns were inserted into this synthetic AGC system. We used
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real time actual load measurements and the load forecast data from two areas in NY-ISO
[42], and generated load deviation values for our system by subtracting the forecast values
from actual load values. We also scaled the load deviations down to fit the parameters of our
small example grid. Then each one of those signals was placed on each of our load buses to
simulate the load deviations. We simulated the AGC system, driven by these disturbances -
deviations in loads, and generated realistic measurements of frequency, tie-line flows, as well
as a realistic ACE signal. To obtain the attacked data, we inject false data into the tie-line
power flow measurements and ACE will be calculated by AGC with the attacked tie-line
power flow data.
4.4.3 Real Dataset
The real dataset used in the work is the ACE data from PJM (PJM Interconnection)
[44], an electric regional transmission organization (RTO). The dataset includes four years’
ACE data, from the year 2012 to 2015, with about 2 million data records. Each record
provides the ACE value and its date and time. These datasets are normal data without any
attack. To generate the attacked data, we inject false data to ACE directly.
4.5 Evaluation
In this section, we will test how the proposed methods perform on simulated dataset
and real dataset. We first test the detection and localization performance of multi-feature
LSTM-based method on simulated dataset. Then we will test the single-feature LSTM-based
method, Fourier Transform-based method on the simulated dataset and compare them with
multi-feature LSTM-based method respectively. We also test these methods on a real dataset.
Since the real dataset has no frequency, tie-line power flow, real load and forecast load data
except ACE data, multi-feature LSTM-based method cannot be tested on real dataset. Only
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single-feature LSTM and Fourier Transform-based methods will be tested on real dataset.
4.5.1 Multi-Feature LSTM-based Method on Simulated Dataset
This dataset used in the experiments is the simulated dataset as described in Section
4.4.2. The simulated dataset includes about 1 million records and each record has ACE,
frequency, tie-line power flow, real load and forecast load data. We split the dataset into
two parts: 67% as training data and 33% as testing data. The training dataset is used to
train the LSTM model, which has a hidden layer with 100 neurons and an output layer to
make predictions. The sigmoid function is used as activation function for the LSTM neurons.
Here n is set as 10 because the shortest attacked sequence which can negatively influence
the system is 10 as discussed in [57]. The input data sequence size m is set as 5, which
can be adjusted based on different power systems’ datasets. The attacks are only launched
periodically into testing data every 10 cycles. To test the model’s performance, we feed the
attacked data into the model to check the True Positive (TP) detection rate which is defined
as the fraction of attacks successfully detected. We also feed the normal data without attacks
into the model to see the False Positive (FP) detection rate which is defined as the fraction
of normal data sequences falsely detected as attacked data. We also test the localization
rate to see how many attacks can be localized correctly.
The setting of the threshold θ is critical. If the threshold is too low, some normal
data sequences will be detected as attacked data. If the threshold is too high, the attacked
data sequences may not be detected. The higher is the threshold and the lower is the FP
rate. In the following, we set the threshold as 0.03, which has a FP rate of less than 5%.
Random Attack: In this experiment, we set the attack lower bound λa = 0 and
launched random attacks to tie-line power flow measurements periodically. The ACEs are
calculated with the attacked tie-line power flow measurements. Fig. 4.9 shows the ACE
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ACE with Random Attack
Figure 4.9: ACE and ACE with Random
Attack















Distance of Normal ACE
Distance of Attacked ACE
Threshold
Figure 4.10: Distances of Normal ACE
and ACE with Random Attacks
with random attacks when λb = 0.1. The red line shows ACE with random attacks and
blue line show normal ACE data. As shown in this figure, the average of normal ACE is
about -3.5. The random attacks with λb = 0.1 will change ACE by less than 0.1, which is
only about 2.8%. LSTM model will calculate the distances between predicted ACEs and
real ACE measurements and then compare the distances with threshold as we discussed
in Section 4.3.2. The calculated distances are shown in Fig. 4.10. The red bars show the
distances between attacked ACE measurements and predicted ACEs, and blue bars show the
distances between normal ACE measurements and predicted ACEs. The threshold is set as
θ = 0.3. From the figure we can see that almost all the distances of normal ACEs are under
threshold while the distances of attacked ACEs are above the threshold. The detection and
localization results are shown in Fig. 4.11. The results show that when λ is higher, the
TP detection rate is also higher. This is because higher λ means the attacks have more
significant modifications on ACE data and thus such attacks are easier to be detected (note
that these attacks also have higher impact to the power grid). When λ = 0.1, the attack
only change ACEs by less than 2.8%, but it can still detect more than 98% attacks. All the
FP rates are under 1.3% and the localization rates are above 94%.
Ramp Attack: Fig. 4.12 shows the ACE with ramp attacks when λ = 0.04. On
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FP Rate of Detection on Random Attack
Figure 4.11: Detection and Localization of Multi-Feature LSTM on Random Attack
average, the attacks add about 0.2 to normal ACEs and the ramp attacks with λ = 0.04 will
change ACEs by about 5%. Similar to random attacks, Fig. 4.13 shows that almost all the
distance bars of attacked ACEs are above threshold while the distances of normal ACES are
under threshold. Its detection and localization results are shown in Fig. 4.14. When λ is
higher, the TP detection rate is also higher. When λ >= 0.04, More than 97% attacks can
be detected. The FP is under 3.5% and the localization is above 94%.











ACE with Ramp Attack
Figure 4.12: ACE and ACE with Ramp
Attack
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Distance of Attacked ACE
Threshold
Figure 4.13: Distance of Normal ACE and
ACE with Ramp Attacks
Scale Attack: Fig. 4.16 shows the ACE with scale attacks when λ = 0.04. From
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FP Rate of Detection on Ramp Attack
Figure 4.14: Detection and Localization
of Multi-Feature LSTM on Ramp Attack
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FP Rate of Detection on Scale Attack
Figure 4.15: Detection and Localization
of Multi-Feature LSTM on Scale Attack
the figure, it can be seen that the attacks change ACEs by about 4%. Similar to random
attacks, Fig.4.17 shows that the threshold can separate the distances of attacked ACEs from
the distances of normal ACES very well. Its detection and localization results are shown in
Fig. 4.15. When λ is higher, the TP detection rate is also higher. When λ >= 0.04, More
than 99% attacks can be detected. The FP is under 2% and the localization is above 94%.













ACE with Scale Attack
Figure 4.16: ACE and ACE with Scale
Attack
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Figure 4.17: Distance of Normal ACE and
Attacked ACE with Scale Attacks
Min Attack: In this experiment, we launched Min attacks by replacing real ACEs
with the minimum ACEs in the last 400 cycles. Fig. 4.18 shows the ACE with Min attacks.
It can be seen that in some AGC cycles, the attacks are very obvious while in some cycles
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ACE with Min Attack
Figure 4.18: ACE and ACE with Min At-
tack
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Figure 4.19: Distance of Normal ACE and
Attacked ACE with Min Attacks
the attacks can be negligible. This is because the current ACE is the minimum ACE so far
and thus the real ACE measurement is used as the minimum attacked data. The Min attack
data is actually the real ACE data and has no any modification on real ACEs. When the
Min attacks are the ACEs themselves, our method cannot detect them and there is also no
need to detect them since they don’t have any impact on the power system. That is why
the TP rate shown in Fig. 4.20 is not as high as other attacks such as random attacks. The












Figure 4.20: Detection and Localization












Figure 4.21: Detection and Localization
of Multi-Feature LSTM on Max Attack
Max Attack: In this experiment, we launched Max attacks by replacing real ACEs
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ACE with Max Attack
Figure 4.22: ACE and ACE with Max At-
tack
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Figure 4.23: Distance of Normal ACE and
Attacked ACE with Max Attacks
with the maximum ACEs in last 400 cycles. Fig. 4.22 shows the ACE with Max attacks.
It has similar trends and attributes with Min attacks. The TP rate is shown in Fig. 4.21,
which is similar to Max attacks. This is because in some AGC cycles, the maximum attack
data is the real ACEs themselves. Such attacks have no modification on real ACEs and thus
have no impacts on power systems.
4.5.2 Comparison with Single-Feature LSTM
In this section, we test the performance of single-feature LSTM-based detection
method on the simulated dataset and also compare multi-feature LSTM-based method with
it. Because of the space limitation, we will only compare the detection performances on
random attack, ramp attack and scale attack.
Comparison On Random Attack: Fig. 4.24 shows the comparison between multi-
feature LSTM and single-feature LSTM under same settings and same attacks. From the
figure, we can see that single-feature LSTM-based method also has great performance on
random attack detection. When λ = 0.1, it can detect more than 95% attacks. However, the
multi-feature LSTM-based method still outperforms it, especially when the attack parameter
is low, which means attacks are not obvious. For example, when λ = 0.05, the multi-feature
68




















TP Rate of Multi-feature LSTM
TP Rate of Single-feature LSTM

















FP Rate of Multi-feature LSTM
FP Rate of Single-feature LSTM
Figure 4.24: Comparison between Multi-
feature LSTM and Single-feature LSTM on
Random Attack
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FP Rate of Single-feature LSTM
Figure 4.25: Comparison between Multi-
feature LSTM and Single-feature LSTM on
Ramp Attack
LSTM has about 93% detection rate, while single-feature LSTM has only 60%.
Comparison On Ramp Attack: Fig. 4.25 shows the comparison between multi-
feature LSTM and single-feature LSTM under same settings and ramp attacks. The results
show that single-feature LSTM-based method has great performance on ramp attack detec-
tion and the multi-feature LSTM-based method still outperforms it.
Comparison On Scale Attack: Fig. 4.26 shows the comparison between multi-
feature LSTM and single-feature LSTM under scale attacks. It can seen that the single-
feature LSTM-based method performs poorly on scale attack detection. When λ = 0.05,
it can only detect about 50% attacks. This is because LSTM model learns data patterns
and then detect attacks based on predicted patterns. However, scale attacks just scale the
data’s value up or down and do not change the ACE data sequence patterns. Single-feature
LSTM-based method will assume ACE is normal if its pattern is normal. Different from
single-feature LSTM which only relies on ACE data, multi-feature LSTM also relies on
many other data such as frequency and real load in addition to ACEs. Even though ACE
pattern is not changed, it can still be found whether ACE value is normal with the help of
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Figure 4.26: Comparison between Multi-
feature LSTM and Single-feature LSTM on
Scale Attack
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Figure 4.29: Fourier Transform on Max
Attack
4.5.3 Fourier Transform-based Method on Simulated Dataset
In this section, we test how fourier transform-based method performs on attack de-
tection and localization. We launched same attacks with multi-feature LSTM testing. Fig.
4.27 shows the detection and localization accuracy of Fourier Transform-based method under
scale, ramp and random attacks. The threshold is set as 0.03 when the FP rate is 4.3%.
As shown in Fig. 4.27, Fourier Transform method can have more than 90% detection and
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localization accuracy for scale and ramp attacks, but it does not perform very well in random
attack detection and localization. The detection and localization on Min and Max attacks
are shown in Fig. 4.28 and Fig. 4.29 respectively.
4.5.4 LSTM and Fourier Transform-based Methods on Real Dataset
lambda























TP Rate of Single-feature LSTM on Random Attack
TP Rate of Fourier Transform on Random Attack
Figure 4.30: Detection of
Single-Feature LSTM and
Fourier Transform on Ran-
dom Attack
lambda
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Figure 4.31: Detection of
Single-Feature LSTM and
Fourier Transform on Ramp
Attack
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TP Rate of Single-feature LSTM on Scale Attack
Figure 4.32: Detection of
Single-Feature LSTM and
Fourier Transform on Scale
Attack
In this section, we test the LSTM-based method and Fourier Transform-based method
on the real dataset. Since there is no frequency, tie-line power flow, real load and forecast
load data in the real dataset, we are not able to test multi-feature LSTM-based method
on the real dataset. Single-feature LSTM and Fourier Transform-based method are tested.
As we discussed in Section 4.2.2, same attack parameters may have different impacts on
different power system. For this power system where the real dataset was generated, when
random attack λb = 0.1, ramp attack λr = 0.1, and scale attack parameter λs = 0.1, ACE
are changed by about 5%, 5%, and 10% on average, respectively. The detection results of
single-feature LSTM and Fourier Transform on random attack, ramp attack and scale attack
are shown in Fig. 4.30, Fig. 4.31 and Fig. 4.32. The results show that the single-feature
LSTM has better performance than Fourier Transform on random and ramp attacks. For
example, when random attack’s parameter λ = 0.1, single-feature LSTM can detect more
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than 90% random attacks. However, it performs poorly on scale attack as we discussed in
Section 4.5.2. The Fourier Transform is able to detect scale attacks effectively as shown
in Fig. 4.32. Therefore, we can use single-feature LSTM-based method to detect random
and ramp attacks and use Fourier Transform as the complementary method to detect scale
attacks.
4.6 Related Work
Some work have been done about attacks on AGC. In [57], the work explored how
to launch attacks to achieve expected effects in the shortest time, but no detection method
was given. In [51], Sridhar et al. developed a model-based anomaly detection algorithm,
in which the ACE values were predicted in 5-minute intervals based on load forecast. The
real-time value of ACE will be regarded as an anomaly if it is not in the forecast range.
This method heavily depends on load forecast. However, in the practical power system,
load forecasting accuracy is not high enough, which will affect the ACE prediction accuracy.
The work in [2] presents a two-tier intrusion detection system. The first tier forecasts the
ACE value for the next time instance based on the current time instance. The measurement
deviating from the prediction will be flagged as anomalous and then the flagged instance
is passed to the second tier to verify anomaly by incorporating the overall system variable.
However, the algorithm only uses the data of one time point and if this time point’s data is
abnormal or attacked, its prediction will be misled. The approach presented in [34] adopts
a security game model to choose the best response strategies against attackers, but it does
not give an approach to detect the attacks.
The work in [31] proposed physics-based and learning-based methods to detect false
data injection attacks. The physics-based method uses alternative computation of ACE
by using a more detailed model of the control area and the learning-based method uses
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single-feature LSTM model to predict ACEs. However, the physics-based method requires
more noise-free measurements and needs more complex computations, and the learning-
based method cannot detect scale attacks effectively. In addition, they are not tested on real
datasets and it is unknown how they will perform in real world. [20] develops a deep learning-
based method, Conditional Deep Belief Network, to detect false data injection attacks. It
requires attacked data as the training dataset and thus how the model performs heavily
depends on what types of attacks are included in the training dataset. If one attack type is
not included in the training dataset, it will be difficult to be detected. However, there are
not many available attacked data that can be used as training data in practice.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter we mainly propose Neural Network-based method (multi-feature LSTM
and single-feature LSTM) and Fourier Transform-based method to detect and localize false
data injection attacks. We test these methods on random attack, ramp attack, scale attack,
min attack and max attack on real and simulated datasets. The experiments show both
LSTM-based and Fourier transform-based methods have promising performance on attack
detection and localization. Specifically, multi-feature LSTM-based has better performance
than single-feature LSTM and Fourier transform-based method. The single-feature LSTM-
based method can detect most of the attacks but cannot detect scale attacks effectively,
while Fourier Transform-based method has good performance on scale attacks. They can be
used as complementary detection methods.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we studied how to help counter the vulnerabilities in power sys-
tems. Specifically, we automatically analyzed the vulnerabilities and determined remediation
actions, optimized remediation action applying order to reduce the system’s security risk,
and identified whether there is any vulnerability that has been exploited for this system.
We first proposed a machine learning-based framework to automate remediation de-
cision analysis for electric utilities in Chapter 2, which applied a predictive decision tree
model over vulnerability features and asset features to predict the remediation decision for
each vulnerability. The model is built over historical, manual remediation decision data to
capture and mimic how human operators make decisions, but it can make decisions much
more quickly than manual analysis. We tested an instance of the framework customized
for one electric utility over two datasets obtained from the utility. Results showed high
prediction accuracy and time savings.
We then scheduled the remediation action applying order so that the system’s total
risk is as low as possible in Chapter 3. We predicted the vulnerabilities’ probability of being
exploited over time. Each vulnerability’s risk can be calculated based on its impact score on
the system and the predicted probability. Then we model the scheduling problem as MIP
model and get the optimized scheduling patching order so that the total risk is minimum. The
evaluation based on a utility company’s real data shows our method can significantly reduce
the risk. This scheduling optimization is the following step of the work in Chapter 2. After
we determine the vulnerabilities’ remediation actions, we can first apply the optimization
method on the group of vulnerabilities that need to be patched and mitigated, to determine
the patching and mitigation order. Then apply this method on the vulnerabilities that can
74
be patched later and get their optimized scheduling order.
In Chapter 4, we identify whether a vulnerability has already been exploited specif-
ically for a power system. We give a detailed case study about how to identify exploited
vulnerabilities by detecting attacks in the AGC system. We proposed Neural Network-
based method (multi-feature LSTM and single-feature LSTM) and Fourier Transform-based
method to detect false data injection attacks. We test these methods on random attack,
ramp attack, scale attack, min attack and max attack with real and simulated datasets. The
experiments show that both LSTM-based and Fourier Transform-based method have good
performance and can also be used as complementary detection methods.
5.2 Future Work
In the dissertation, we studied how to counter vulnerabilities in power systems. There
is still more work to explore.
• Explore better-than-human remediation decisions: in Chapter 2 we applied machine
learning techniques to make remediation decisions by mimicking human reasoning. In
fact, machine learning can take much more factors and address more complicated rules
than human and thus can help make better decisions. We will explore how to make
better-than-human remediation decisions by utilizing machine learning techniques.
• Explore how to apply remediation actions with less human intervention: after schedul-
ing the remediation actions applying order, operators still need manually apply the re-
mediation actions. In the future work, we will analyze the patch and devices/software
characteristics, and patch workflow to automate the remediation applying process.
• Identify more exploited vulnerabilities: in this dissertation, we mainly identified ex-
ploited vulnerabilities by detecting false data injection attacks. In the future, we will
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